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View all search resultsWhen a peaceful student protest over fuel prices is met with 500 soldiers and hidden legal maneuvers, it signals a quiet, dangerous shift from democratic policing to increasing militarization.
tudent movements always carry a double burden: students must speak for themselves while serving as a megaphone for those who cannot, or dare not, speak. Amid mounting economic pressure and a steadily narrowing public sphere, that voice grows more necessary even as it becomes harder to raise. The students are not a narrow interest group; they are proxies for a collective unease far wider than what is visible on the surface.
Within 48 hours of the nonsubsidized fuel price hike that took effect on June 10, demonstrations erupted at five locations across Indonesia. The wave began in Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi on the night of June 10, then spread to Bandung and peaked in Jakarta on June 12, when an alliance of the University of Indonesia and Greater Jakarta student bodies staged the "Toward a Bankrupt Indonesia" protest at 33 places.
Born in Kendari, far from the national spotlight, the first protest signaled that economic pressure is not merely an agenda manufactured by elite campuses, but a lived reality felt first in regions with the thinnest margins of economic resilience.
What unfolded in Jakarta, however, was not merely large crowds met by security personnel. Behind the more than 6,000 combined officers lined up from Semanggi cloverleaf to Thamrin Nine building lies a logic that warrants closer reading: a creeping militarization that arrives not by explicit proclamation, but through administrative mechanisms, circulars and the language of "assistance." This restriction operates in three distinct layers.
The first layer is the most visible. Five hundred camouflage-clad soldiers stood at the front of the cordon blocking students moving toward the Hotel Indonesia traffic circle. The military’s spokesperson classified this as "assistance to the police in accordance with the mechanism”. Procedurally, this may be true. But in democratic terms, that is precisely where the question begins: How often does such a "request" occur, and is the repetition of an emergency mechanism enough to turn it into the norm?
The second is subtler, and therefore more troubling. On June 11, the Defense Ministry issued a letter ordering roughly 500 members of the Reserve Component (Komcad), drawn from 42 ministries, to attend a roll call the following morning. The ministry denied any link to the demonstration, calling it a "routine readiness exercise", and indeed, no reserve personnel appeared in the field. Yet the Civil Society Coalition for Security Sector Reform raised a fundamental question: What is the legal basis of the mobilization?
Article 63(1) of Law No. 23/2019 on National Resources Management for National Defense states that mobilization may be ordered by the president only when the state faces an explicit defense threat. Under civil order, activating reserve defense instruments - even for an assembly - lacks adequate legal foundation. What threat did the state face that required summoning its reserve component?
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